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ABSTRACT
Infrastructure systems are becoming increasingly complex and interdependent. As a result our ability to predict the 
likelihood of large-scale failure of these systems has significantly diminished and the consequence of this is that we 
now have a greatly increased risk of devastating impacts to society.
Traditionally these systems have been analysed using physically-based models. However, this approach can only 
provide information for a specific network and is limited by the number of scenarios that can be tested. In an attempt 
to overcome this shortcoming, many studies have used network graph theory to provide an alternative analysis 
approach. This approach has tended to consider infrastructure systems in isolation, but has recently considered 
the analysis of interdependent networks through combination with percolation theory. However, these studies have 
focused on the analysis of synthetic networks and tend to only consider the topology of the system.
In this paper we develop a new analysis approach, based upon network theory, but accounting for the hierarchical 
structure and functional dependency observed in real world infrastructure networks. We apply this method to two 
real world networks, to show that it can be used to quantify the impact that failures within an electricity network have 
upon a dependent water network.
Keywords: Resilience, Interdependency, Network Graph Theory, Hazard
MODELLING INTERDEPENDENT INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS
Network theory is an area of graph theory that concerns the study of graphs, which are mathematical structures 
used to model relationships between discrete objects. In this context a ‘graph’, or network, consists of nodes and 
connecting edges. The study of networks is a relatively young area of research and has been largely driven by the 
desire to study real world networks, such as social and biological networks. One of the main contributions of this area 
of research is the discovery and classification of underlying patterns in many real world networks. There are four main 
classes of network, into which the many real world networks (including infrastructure systems) can be placed. Each 
of these classes are distinguished by a degree distribution, where the degree of a node is the number of connections 
it has with other nodes and the degree distribution of a network is the probability distribution of these degrees for the 
whole network. 
The first documented network class was the random graph1, which has since been shown to be a poor 
1  Erdos, P. & Renyi, A. On The Evolution of Random Graphs. Publication of the Mathematical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences 5, 17-61 (1960).
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representation of real world networks. However, this network class formed the basis for the small-world network 
class, developed by Watts and Strogatz2, which has been shown to replicate a range of real world networks including 
subway systems3. These two classes of network are characterised by a Poisson degree distribution; however, 
Barabasi and Albert discovered that real world networks tend to form a power law degree distribution4. Networks that 
follow this power law are more commonly known as scale-free networks and include the Internet and the World-
Wide-Web.5 Other real world networks, including power grids, have been found to have an exponential degree 
distribution and are termed ‘exponential networks’. 6,7,8
The main advantage of classifying a real world network into a network class is that it gives an insight into the inherent 
hazard tolerance of a network. For example, infrastructure systems have been shown to fall into either the scale-free 
or exponential network class9,10 and these networks consist of a small number of highly connected nodes and a large 
number of weakly connected nodes. As such they have been shown to be vulnerable to targeted attack, as this will 
tend to remove one of the highly connected nodes to cause the maximum disruption, and also resilient to random 
hazard, as this will tend to remove one of the many weakly connected components11. 
In this paper, we are considering the hazard tolerance of two real world networks and whether we can use this 
approach to gain an insight into their resilience to different attack strategies. We have constructed a network model 
of both networks using data obtained from a real electricity distribution network and a real water network that 
is, in reality, connected to the electricity network. The electricity network consists of 883 nodes (representing the 
Grid Supply Points, Bulk Supply Points, Primary Substations and Distribution Substations) and 3039 connecting 
links; whilst the water network consists of 144 nodes (representing the Source Nodes, Pumping Stations, Water 
Treatment Works, Service Reservoirs and Demand Nodes) and 305 connecting links. For a detailed explanation of 
the process used to model real world networks using network graph theory, the reader is directed to Dunn et al.12 
The degree distributions for these two networks have been shown in Figure 1. From this figure, it can be seen that 
the water network clearly follows an exponential distribution (forming a straight line when the results are plotted on 
a log-linear axis). However, it is more difficult to classify the electricity network, as it does not appear to fit exactly 
into one network class. This is due to the presence of a large number of small degree nodes. As the water network 
can be classed as exponential, it should be resilient to random hazard and vulnerable to targeted attack. However, 
classifying these networks does not necessarily give an insight into the hazard tolerance of the water network when 
the electricity network is disrupted, as the dependent links between these networks are not considered. To establish 
this relationship, an additional analysis approach is needed.  
2  Watts, D. J. & Strogatz, S. H. Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks. Nature 393, 440-442 (1998).
3  Latora, V. & Marchiori, M. Is the Boston subway a small-world network? Physica a-Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 314, 109-
113 (2002).
4  Barabasi, A. L. & Albert, R. Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286, 509-512 (1999).
5  Barabasi, A. L., Albert, R. & Jeong, H. Scale-free characteristics of random networks: the topology of the World-Wide Web. Physica A 
281, 69-77 (2000).
6  Amaral, L. A. N., Scala, A., Barthelemy, M. & Stanley, H. E. Classes of small-world networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America 97, 11149-11152 (2000).
7  Liu, J. Z. & Tang, Y. F. An exponential distribution network. Chinese Physics 14, 643-645 (2005).
8  Wilkinson, S. M. & Henderson, N. A. in 14th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering (Beijing, China, 2008).
9  Crucitti, P., Latora, V. & Marchiori, M. A topological analysis of the Italian electric power grid. Physica a-Statistical Mechanics and Its 
Applications 338, 92-97, doi:10.1016/j.physa.2004.02.029 (2004).
10  Wilkinson, S., Dunn, S. & Ma, S. The vulnerability of the European air traffic network to spatial hazards. Natural Hazards 60, 1027-1036, 
doi:10.1007/s11069-011-9885-6 (2012).
11  Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Barabasi, A. L. Error and Attack Tolerance of Complex Networks. Nature 406, 378-382 (2000).
12  Dunn, S., Fu, G., Wilkinson, S. & Dawson, R. Network theory for infrastructure systems modelling. Proceedings of the ICE - Engineering 
Sustainability 166, 281-292 (2013).23
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Figure 1: The degree distributions for the (a) energy and (b) water networks.
Previous studies have modelled the interdependency between two coupled networks by using additional links, which 
are usually directed, to represent the dependence of components in one network upon those in another. One study 
by Buldyrev et al.13 assessed impact of failure within Internet infrastructure as a result of disruption to electricity 
infrastructure. In their study, they identified the dependent links between the two networks by coupling each Internet 
server to the geographically nearest power station. They then removed power stations, at random, and observed the 
resulting impact to the Internet network, following an iterative process to fail connected nodes. Nodes were deemed 
to have failed if (1) all of their connected nodes were failed and/or (2) their dependent node in the other network 
was failed. They showed that these networks were extremely sensitive to random failures and that the removal of a 
small fraction of nodes in one network was sufficient to produce an iterative cascade of failures in the interdependent 
network. 
Further studies have attempted to identify a critical threshold (or proportion of failed nodes) which induces this 
cascade of failures in the dependent network, by combining network theory with percolation theory. One notable 
study by Gao et al.14, developed this approach and used it to study the failures between two partially interdependent 
random networks. In their study, they ‘fail’ a proportion of nodes in one network and observe how the failure 
propagates to the connected network, by defining two conditions for failure: (1) nodes fail if they do not belong to the 
largest cluster of nodes, and (2) nodes also fail if they depend on the failed nodes in the other network. 
However, this percolation theory approach only considers the topology of the network and does not consider the 
direction of flow in these networks or their hierarchical structure. For example, in electricity infrastructure a Primary 
Substation can only operate if it is connected to, at least one, Bulk Supply Point and this is not captured in a purely 
topological model. Therefore, we develop a new approach which recognises that nodes are used to represent a 
range of components and that flow between these components is not always bi-directional. 
DEVELOPMENT OF FUNCTIONAL DEPENDENCY MODEL
We develop what we term a ‘functional dependency’ model which incorporates the hierarchical structure of real world 
infrastructure networks and the direction of flow through the use of directed links. Following traditional network theory 
models, we use nodes to represent the different components in both networks, however, unlike traditional models we 
record the type of component that the node represents. Figure 2 shows the type, and number, of each component in 
both the electricity (red) and water (blue) networks. 
By recording the different types of nodes we can ensure that the hierarchical structure, observed in real world 
networks, is maintained (e.g. electricity can flow from a Grid Supply Point to a Bulk Supply Point, but not vice versa). 
We could simulate the flow of service in these networks using a flow model, such as that presented by Dunn and 
13  Buldyrev, S. V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H. E. & Havlin, S. Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks. Nature 
464, 1025-1028, doi:10.1038/nature08932 (2010).
14  Gao, J. X., Buldyrev, S. V., Stanley, H. E. & Havlin, S. Networks formed from interdependent networks. Nat. Phys. 8, 40-48 (2012).24
Wilkinson15; however, we deem a detailed study of flow and capacity outside the scope of this paper and therefore 
use the hierarchical structure to make an assumption regarding the capacity of each of the ‘supply’ components (e.g. 
Grid Supply Points and Service Reservoirs). The intention is not to replicate the extant network precisely, but rather to 
develop a plausible model that captures the essential failure characteristics of the real network. 
 
Source Nodes 13
Pumping Stations 27
Water Treatment Works 3
Service Reservoir 16
Demand Nodes 85
Grid Supply Point 2
Bulk Supply Point 5
Primary Substation 15
Distribution Substation 861
Electricity Network Water Network
Figure 2: Showing the number of each individual component in the energy (red) and water (blue) networks and the 
interconnectivity of these components (black lines). 
In the electricity network we achieve this by using Dijkstra’s algorithm to calculate the length, in terms of the number 
of nodes traversed, of the shortest route from each Distribution Substation to each Primary Substation. It is assumed 
that the closest Primary Substation supplies the Distribution Substation under normal operational conditions. 
Based on discussions with local experts, we also define the limit to the area a primary substation might supply in an 
emergency as 50% greater than its supply boundary in its typical configuration. 
In the water network, the dependencies of the different components in the raw water sections of the network are 
easily understood, they take the shape of dendritic patterns feeding into the three water treatment works which 
then feed directly into service reservoirs. The downstream network requires more interpretation. In addition to the 
connectivity of the network, the ability of a service reservoir to feed a demand node is based upon their respective 
elevations. If the reservoir level was more than 20 metres above the highest property in the demand node then it can 
be supplied (the 20 meter difference accounts for the need to deliver a minimum level of pressure to a consumer’s 
property). It is assumed that pumping stations can provide a pressure equivalent to the level of the highest point they 
supply. 
The identification of dependent links between the networks is simplified because, as major consumers, the water 
components generally have named substations. The proximal substation was used for the two components where 
this was not the case. Between these networks we identified 31 dependent links and the components they connect 
have been shown in Figure 2 (black arrows). 
In a similar manner to previous studies, we randomly fail a proportion of nodes in the electricity network and observe 
how this failure propagates to the dependent water network, by defining two conditions of failure. Nodes in the water 
network are deemed to have failed if they are (1) no longer connected to at least one functional ‘parent’ node (e.g. 
a node that is directly above them in the hierarchical structure), or (2) are connected to a dependent node in the 
other network which has been failed. However, unlike previous studies, we observe how the failure of components at 
different levels in the electricity network impacts the water network. We initially fail a proportion of nodes of different 
components (termed primary failure) and observe how this failure cascades throughout the network (removing further 
nodes, termed secondary failure), before considering how this failure propagates to the water network. The results of 
this analysis are shown in Figure 3.
15  Dunn, S. & Wilkinson, S. Identifying Critical Components in Infrastructure Networks Using Network Topology. Journal of Infrastructure 
Systems 19, 157-165, doi:10.1061/(ASCE)IS.1943-555X.0000120 (2013).25
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Figure 3: Showing the number of failed demand nodes in the water network, due to the failure of (a) the grid supply points, (b) 
bulk supply points, (c) primary substations and (d) distribution substations in the electricity network. 
From Figure 3, it can be seen that the removal of different components in the electricity network have different 
impacts upon the water network. This is expected; removing a distribution substation is unlikely to affect other 
nodes but the effect of a lost bulk supply point will cascade through the system. However, it is interesting to note the 
different patterns of impacts caused by the failures at different levels in the hierarchy. For example, it can be seen that 
the correlation between primary substations failures and failed demand components is non-linear, and appears to 
increase exponentially (Figure 3(c)). By contrast the correlation between the number of failed distribution substations 
and the number of demand components (Figure 3(d)) is linear, although there is a large amount of scatter in the 
results. 
It is also evident that the complete failure of the electricity network (shown on the extreme right of the graphs in Figure 
3) does not result in the complete failure of the water network. This is due to the presence of the service reservoirs 
(which do not require a supply of electricity to function) meaning that approximately 80% of the demand components 
network remain functional. It should be noted that we only perform a static analysis, and therefore do not capture 
the depletion of these resources; however, these components typically have sufficient capacity to last longer than the 
power companies’ expected return to service time.26
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a new approach to the analysis of interdependent failures between two coupled 
networks. Our approach is based upon traditional network theory, modelling the networks as a series of nodes and 
connecting links, but maintains the hierarchical structure of real world infrastructure networks and also makes an 
assumption of the supply capacity of each of the ‘supply’ nodes through the use of directed links. We have applied 
this approach to analyse two real world networks, an electricity network and a dependent water network, to assess 
how failures within the electricity network propagate to the water network. Through this analysis it was shown that 
the failure of different components in the electricity network can have vastly different impacts to the water network. 
This approach could be used in future studies to increase the validity of using network theory models to assess the 
impacts of cascading failures between two coupled networks. 
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